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What	will	crashing	the	economy	do	for	the	UK
housing	market?
Discussing	the	potential	effects	of	the	COVID-19	lockdown	on	housing,	Paul	Cheshire	and	Christian	Hilber	write
that	real	house	prices	and	rents	may	fall	in	the	short-	to	medium-term.	Yet	housing	will	remain	unaffordable	for	the
young	and	those	on	lower	incomes,	especially	in	London	and	the	South	East,	as	this	fall	will	be	driven	by	a	fall	in
earnings.
To	speculate	usefully	about	the	effects	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic	on	Britain’s	housing	market	one	needs	a	clear
analytical	understanding	of	how	our	housing	markets	work	and	what	forces	cause	them	to	change.	Given	the
extreme	uncertainty	about	the	impact	and	evolution	of	the	COVID-19	pandemic,	anything	in	this	blog	is	in	some
sense	speculation,	but	we	hope	informed	speculation.	A	recent	academic	paper	analysing	the	impacts	on	house
prices	and	rents	of	historic	epidemics	in	Amsterdam	and	Paris	found	only	relatively	short-lived	and	localised
reductions	in	house	prices	and	smaller	effects	on	rents	than	on	prices.	While	useful,	we	are	cautious	about	trying	to
draw	direct	lessons	from	such	historic	examples:	not	least	because	the	extent	of	lockdown	and	economic	disruption
now	is	an	order	of	magnitude	greater.	COVID-19	is	a	true	pandemic,	affecting	the	whole	interdependent	world
economy	at	the	same	time.
Apart	from	applying	basic	analytical	tools	it	is	also	probably	useful	to	look	at	the	impacts	in	terms	of	three	time
horizons:	the	short	term	–	over	the	next	6	to	9	months;	the	medium	term	-up	to	about	2024;	and	the	long	term	–
over	the	next	10+	years.	The	further	ahead	one	looks	the	more	uncertainty	attaches	to	one’s	predictions,	but	we	will
do	our	best.
Britons	have	become	conditioned	to	expect	rising	house	prices	in	real	terms.	After	all,	they	have	increased	fivefold
since	the	1950s,	faster	than	in	any	other	OECD	country.	This	rise	has	been	driven	mainly	by	rising	real	incomes	–
over	that	period	they	increased	threefold	–	and	an	increasingly	fixed	supply	of	housing	in	large	parts	of	the	country.
The	supply	of	new	houses	is	so	inflexible	because	our	planning	system	is	dysfunctional	and	our	system	of	local
government	finance	provides	no	incentives	for	local	authorities	to	permit	development	(see	here,	here	or	here).	It	is
rising	real	incomes	that	fuel	the	demand	for	‘housing	services’	(reflected	in	rents)	but	part	of	what	fuels	the	demand
for	housing	as	an	asset	is	rising	house	prices	relative	to	the	price	of	other	assets.	And	this,	in	turn,	given	the	nearly
fixed	supply	of	houses,	may	fuel	further	price	rises.
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So	this	is	the	first	pointer	to	what	the	COVID-19	crisis	will	do	to	the	British	housing	market.	In	the	very	short	term,	it
will	produce	stasis:	buying	and	selling	will	all	but	stop.	Indeed,	they	already	have	–	Zoopla	reports	a	40%	drop	in
enquiries	for	late	March.	Even	when	the	lockdown	is	over	and	the	market	‘unfreezes’,	the	transaction	volume	is
likely	to	fall	substantially.	In	part	this	will	be	because	households	are	loss	averse	and	not	likely	to	want	to	realise	a
loss;	but	also	because	of	the	probable	ongoing	economic	disruption	discussed	below.
While	construction	of	new	houses	will	be	severely	restricted,	because	new	build	homes	are	such	a	small	fraction	of
the	total	stock,	this	will	make	little	difference	to	total	supply,	so	will	do	little	to	offset	the	fall	in	house	prices.
Moreover,	the	vast	majority	of	COVID-19	deaths	will	be	of	elderly	people,	freeing	up	some	existing	stock	and	thus
reinforcing,	slightly,	the	temporary	downward	trend	in	house	prices.	Overall,	the	supply	side	effect	of	COVID-19	on
house	prices	may	be	rather	muted	as	the	two	effects	(on	construction	and	freed	stock)	may	largely	offset	each
other.
Thus,	in	the	short	term	three	things	mainly	matter:
1.	 How	far	will	lenders	be	willing	–	even	be	able	–	to	flex	to	minimise	the	number	of	forced	sales?	Forced	sales
quickly	translate	into	falling	house	prices	as	we	saw	in	1991;
2.	 How	catastrophically	will	borrowers’	incomes	be	hit	and	for	how	long?;
3.	 How	much	and	for	how	long	will	real	incomes	fall?
We	are	not	medical	experts	so	can	offer	no	forecast	as	to	how	long	the	epidemic	will	last,	nor	the	length	of	the
severest	disruption	of	normal	economic	activity	resulting	from	it.	We	can	offer	two	depressing	thoughts,	however:
despite	reassuring	noises	about	renewed	activity	in	China	by	the	end	of	April,	the	Chinese,	with	far	stronger
controls	and	draconian	powers	of	enforcement,	started	the	lockdown	in	Wuhan	on	23	January.	In	Britain,	a	far	less
effective	lockdown	started	two	months	later.	The	Chinese	began	a	gradual	easing	of	their	lockdown	from	8	April.	So
maybe	the	UK	lockdown	will	continue	till	early	June,	two	months	after	the	start	of	the	easing	in	China.	But	even	then
the	easing	will	be	gradual	and	the	resumption	of	normal	economic	activity	will	take	probably	months	–	assuming
that	there	will	be	no	further	infection	waves	and	depending	on	how	quickly	a	vaccine	can	be	developed	and	made
available.
The	second	depressing	thought	is	that	the	longer	the	lockdown	lasts,	the	slower	the	recovery	will	be.	The	economy
appears	to	be	in	freefall.	Official	data	is	hardly	yet	available	but	there	was	an	ingenious	review	of	current	indicators
in	the	Financial	Times	on	8	April:	car	sales	down	44%	in	March;	restaurant	bookings	on	Open	Table	dropped	to
zero	two	days	before	the	official	lockdown.	The	OBR	14	April	report	was	gloomy	and	emphasised	that	recovery
from	the	initial	near	catastrophic	hit	was	dependent	on	businesses	being	able	to	re-set.	But	it	looks	increasingly
likely	that	many	businesses	will	not	survive:	think	of	all	those	empty	restaurants,	bars	or	theatres;	consider	all	those
empty	planes	or	hairdressers’	salons,	think	about	how	many	small	construction	businesses,	car	dealers	or	gyms
are	at	a	standstill.	The	physical	fabric	will	survive,	but	the	government’s	initiative	to	provide	emergency	finance
seems	plagued	by	delay	and,	while	loans	do	not	come,	more	and	more	businesses	will	go	under.	Recovery	will	be
much	slower	if	the	businesses	themselves	have	to	be	re-invented	and	established	anew.	Demand	may	be	there
and	so	may	the	workers	but	there	have	to	be	businesses	to	organise	the	process	of	production	and	employment.
Turning	to	the	medium	term,	we	first	note	that	the	longer	the	lockdown	and	the	more	businesses	go	under,	the
slower	the	bounce-back	may	be.	The	slower	the	economic	bounce	back,	the	slower	the	recovery	in	the	demand	for
housing	–	driven	by	earnings	–	will	be.	And	even	when	earnings	start	to	recover,	the	savings	of	many	will	have
been	depleted.	Would-be	buyers	will	find	much	of	what	they	had	set	aside	for	deposits	will	have	gone	on	essential
supplies	to	keep	the	household	afloat	while	incomes	were	down.	Buying	a	home	will	have	to	be	postponed	again
even	if	prices	appear	to	be	more	affordable.	It	took	till	1945	for	real	house	prices	to	get	back	to	their	1931	levels:	it
took	till	late	2001	to	get	back	to	1989	real	values.	House	prices	may	have	increased	nearly	fivefold	since	1955	but
there	have	been	prolonged	troughs	along	the	way.	We	would	not	be	surprised	to	find	real	house	prices	in	2024	well
below	present-day	real	values.	The	economic	downturn	triggered	by	COVID-19	may	even	equal	that	of	the	Great
Depression	of	the	1930s.	However,	construction	of	social	housing	may	have	a	bit	of	a	revival.	Lower	house	prices
will	not	improve	affordability	in	the	medium	term,	however,	since	the	cause	would	be	lower	incomes	and	depleted
savings.
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So	what	of	the	long	term?	To	2030	and	beyond.	Here	we	get	even	more	speculative	but	we	will	assume	that	the
pandemic	dies	away	and	the	economy	eventually	recovers.	The	pandemic	could	even	trigger	an	innovation	boost
e.g.	in	communication	technology	(which	might	damage	the	recovery	of	airlines	and	ground	transport)	or	medicine.
And,	although	we	have	long	argued	for	radical	reforms	to	those	policies	impeding	building	more	houses	where
people	want	to	live	(such	as	releasing	Green	Belt	land	around	commuter	stations	or	reforming	the	tax	system	to
incentivise	local	authorities	to	permit	development),	we	will	reluctantly	assume	there	are	none,	at	least	no
meaningful	ones.	One	of	the	downsides	of	our	expected	prolonged	depression	in	real	house	prices	is	that	it	may
take	the	pressure	off	politicians	to	reform	our	dysfunctional	housing	supply.
If	this	is	true,	construction	will	stay	well	below	the	level	needed	to	satisfy	demand,	so	prices	will	take	off	when
incomes	finally	recover.	However,	the	structure	of	demand	may	change.	Already	there	is	talk	of	how	we	will	not	go
back	to	what	we	were	doing	before	COVID-19	struck.	People	may	adjust	to	more	home-working,	including
commuting	to	a	central	office	but	far	less	frequently.	This	would	have	two	implications	(apart	from	those	it	would
have	for	the	demand	for	office	space):	the	first	would	be	that	people	would	demand	more	space	in	their	houses;	the
second	is	that	commuting	costs	might	become	less	important.	These	would	suggest	a	movement	outwards	to	find
cheaper	land	and	space,	and	accept	the	longer	commute	that	implied.	In	fact,	before	COVID-19	struck	there	was
already	evidence	of	people	jumping	the	Green	Belt	so	this	would	be	a	continuation	of	an	existing	trend.
Although	not	strictly	following,	a	further	related	trend	might	be	for	higher-paid	jobs	to	concentrate	even	more
strongly	in	the	first-order	cities,	notably	London,	Manchester,	Edinburgh,	even	Leeds,	at	the	expense	of	second-tier
cities	like	Stoke-on-Trent,	Derby	or	Coventry;	and	demand	for	housing	to	relatively	increase	in	smaller	but	well-
connected	high-amenity	cities	like	Cambridge,	Canterbury,	Exeter,	Harrogate,	Hexham	or	Norwich,	further
increasing	house	price	pressures	in	these	locations.
While	there	is	huge	uncertainty	surrounding	the	COVID-19	crisis	–	not	just	its	impact	on	the	real	economy,	the
financial	markets,	and	the	rate	of	recovery	but	also	longer-term	political	consequences	or	the	impact	on
globalisation	–	one	thing	is	clear:	COVID-19	is	likely	to	have	lasting	effects	on	both	Britain’s	housing	markets	and
housing	policies.	Real	house	prices	(and	rents)	may	fall	in	the	short-	and	medium-term	without	making	housing	less
unaffordable.	It	will	remain	particularly	unaffordable	for	the	young	and	those	on	lower	incomes,	especially	in	London
and	the	South	East,	and	for	those	hardest-hit	by	COVID-19.	When	it	comes	to	housing	policies,	Britain’s
policymakers	(of	all	colours)	would	be	well-advised	not	to	jump	on	the	populist	bandwagon.	There	needs	to	be	a
policy	reaction	reflecting	the	true	causes	rather	than	the	symptoms	of	the	affordability	crisis	and	the	longer-term
reforms	that	are	the	only	way	of	truly	resolving	our	housing	problems.	We	need	to	learn	from	Germany,	not	just	in
terms	of	effective	testing	for	COVID-19,	but	also	from	their	housing	and	planning	policies.
This	post	represents	the	views	of	the	author	and	not	those	of	the	Covid-19	blog,	nor	LSE.	It	first	appeared	at	the
LSE	British	Politics	and	Policy	blog.	Featured	image	credit:	by	Adam	Birkett	on	Unsplash.
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